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Abstract  
  
The extent to which labour market rigidity can be beneficial for an economy is 
investigated in a model where technological change is non-general purpose and 
different types of skills are available to workers. More precisely, specific skills lock a 
worker into a particular technology but increases productivity. Conversely, general 
skills allow workers to move across technologies at the cost of lesser productivity. 
Labour market rigidity is modelled as cross-sectors transfer costs  for general skill 
workers . The main result is that a positive level of labour market rigidity is in 
general beneficial for the economy. In fact, ex post efficiency calls for low market 
rigidity, as this allows more workers to transfer to the innovating sector of the 
economy. Conversely, ex ante efficiency calls for high labour market rigidity, as this 
favours workers’ acquisition of specific skills , wh ich increases output. The 
combination of these two effects results in an inverse-U shaped relationship between 
output and labour market rigidity. A necessary condition for this result to hold is 
that the acquisition of specific skills is ex ante costly , as the rent that must be paid in 
equilibrium to specific skill workers determines a gap in marginal productivity in 
favour of specific skill labour. 
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1 Introduction 
Labour market rigidity has been studied extensively over the last three decades 
in relation to the problem of the poor performance of continental Europe labour 
markets in comparison to that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In particular, the 
various aspects that contribute to make a labour market ‘rigid’ have been analyzed, 
generally leading to negative conclusions as to their effects. For instance, it has been 
argued that high firing costs may increase firms’ reluctance to hire workers, th us 
contributing to make unemployment persistent (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). The 
unemployment benefit system has also been widely blamed for rising 
unemployment above its natural level, because of the related moral hazard problems 
(Layard et al., 1991), and the loss of human capital during unemployment spells 
(Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2002). The rigidity of wage setting mechanisms has also 
been singled out as a possible cause of hysteresis in unemployment1, in particular 
when insiders have higher power than outsiders in wage bargaining (Blanchard and 
Summers, 1987). 
Other scholars have taken a more systemic approach, emphasizing the inability 
of systems characterized by rigid labour markets to adjust either to macroeconomic 
shocks – e.g. the oil price surge , total factor productivity decline, spread of 
information technology and labour demand shifts (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; 
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998) –or to microeconomic shocks – e.g. increased 
turbulence in the earning and employment prospects facin g a worker (Gottshalk 
and Moffitt, 1994), which may lead to increased volatility in local labour demand 
(Bertola and Ichino, 1995). Moreover, these scholars have pointed to such increased 
variability in the economic environment as the main reason why the European 
labour markets outperformed the U.S. labour market before the 70s and later 
underperformed with respect to the U.S. In particular, the interaction between 
different institutions and different shocks may account for different experiences in 
unemployment patterns across countries (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  
That globalisation has played a part in such increased variability of economic 
environments has been stressed by several scholars. For instance, Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (1998: 518) argue that “[…] competition from newly industrialized countries 
increasing internationalization of the production, distribution, and marketing of goods 
and services are rapidly changing the economic environment”, and they assign to such 
changes a key role in their account of the labour market performance. From the 
economic policy standpoint, ‘global’ institutions advocate lesser rigidity in the 
labour market as a necessary step for a country to benefit from trade and capital 
liberalization (e.g. World Bank, 2005). For it is argued that reducing labour costs 
                                              
1 Hysteresis is defined as the situation when temporary shocks have permanent effects on the economy. 
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will create incentives for foreign firms to invest in a country, thus boosting 
employment and generating positive externalities for the rest of the economy. This 
view is supported by the claims that economic globaliza tion is reducing poverty 
around the world and increasing economic prosperity (Collier and Dollar, 2002).  
Although the focus of labour market scholars has generally been on the impact 
of regulation on unemployment, some studies have also emphasized the negative 
consequences of rigidity on productivity, as it contributes to keep inefficient firms 
on the market, in addition to generating rents for employed workers at the expense 
of the unemployed (Saint-Paul, 2000). Hence, considerations of both efficiency and 
equity pave the way for labour market reforms reducing rigidity and inducing 
higher degrees of workers turnover across jobs. 
Obviously, voices of dissent have been raised against this general view. 
Atkinson (1999) has argued that the rolling back of the welfare state to which the 
process of liberalization would lead may in fact decrease labour markets efficiency. 
Others have claimed that higher liberalization, in particular in product markets, 
may end up as having negative effects on employment (Amable and Gatti, 2004). 
Their arguments are bolstered by the conclusion reached by Layard and Nickell 
(1998) that the empirical evidence on the negative impact of labour market rigidity 
is limited to some institutions, mainly unemployment benefits and strong and 
uncoordinated unions, but is at best weak for the remaining ones. Others have also 
pointed to the social costs associated with market liberalization (Rodrik, 1997 ), and 
have noted that welfare institutions tend to be larger in more open countries, thus 
underlining their positive function (Agell, 1999). Finally, the view that economic 
globalisation is increasing prosperity and reducing poverty has been contested on 
empirical and methodological grounds (Wade, 2003 ), thus undermining the claim 
that flexible labour market are necessary for making globalisation work for the 
poor. 
In this paper I wish to add to this debate by focussing on the impact of labour 
rigidity on economic efficiency, as measured by output maximization. The line of 
argument draws upon the classical distinction, originally put forward by Becker 
(1964), between specific and general skills. The former define skills that may mainly 
be used by a worker in relation to a specific firm (or industry), whereas the latter 
refer to skills that may be transferred across jobs. As a result, firm-specific skills 
should result in higher labour productivity at the firm level. Hence, labour market 
rigidity may give appropriate incentives to workers to acquire job-specific skills, 
through decreasing job turnover and increasing job duration. In other words, long-
term relationships in the labour market make for mutual specific investments in a 
worker’s human capital. As a result, labour market rigidity may turn out to be the 
most efficient institutional setting, at least in those contexts where productivity 
gains were favoured by intensive knowledge  of a certain technology. On the other 
hand, the choice of general skills, which is in turn favoured by a flexible labour 
market, may be appropriate in contexts of fast technological change. 
Therefore, the consideration of the right ‘match’ between skills acquisition and 
labour market institutions, and their impact on productivity, should add an element 
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of analysis thus far partially neglected in the debate on labour market institutions. 
In fact, the conjecture that economic systems with more rigid labour markets are 
characterized by higher labour productivity receives some support at the empirical 
level (Layard and Nickell, 1998). Figure 1 plots data for a cross-section of OECD 
countries. These are ranked according to the OECD index of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) on the horizontal axis (with more rigid economies to 
the right-hand side of the axis), whereas the per hour productivity growth rates over 
the 1976 -1992 period is reported on the vertical axis. The relationship between 
employment protection and productivity growth appears to be positive, and a 
quadratic interpolation of the data results in an inverse-U shaped relation. The fact 
that the quadratic term turns out to be weakly significant in a linear regression gives 
some grounds to the conjecture that such a relationship may be non-linear2. Clearly 
both results have to be interpreted with some caution, given the limited amount of 
observations and the presence of some outliers. 
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Figure 1 
Sources: OECD Jobs Study (1994). Part II, Table 6.7, Col. 5, for Employment Protection Index 
(EPL). Country ranking with 20 as the most strictly regulated. Refers to 1990.  
Data for productivity growth rates are taken from Nickell and Layard (1998), Table 4, col. 2. This 
is based on the Summers and Heston database, with hours of work from the OECD Employment 
Outlook, various issues. 
 
At the theoretical level, some studies have indeed taken into account the 
distinction between specific and general skills. For instance, Chari and Hopenayn 
(1991) and Parente (1994) have developed macroeconomic models where learning-
by-doing increases human capital at the firm-specific level. Jovanovic and Nyarko 
(1996) build on this approach to study the trade-off between expanding the 
knowledge of a certain technology, and transferring to more recent technologies. 
The key parameter is the degree of transferability of one’s skills to another 
                                              
2 In particular, a linear regression on this sample of 20 countries, with productivity growth as a dependent 
variable, and EPL and EPL squared as independent variables, returns a positive and significant coefficient for 
EPL (t=2.30), and a negative and weakly significant coefficient for EPL2 (t=-1.83).  
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technology, and as a result a worker may be locked into a certain technology 
although technologies with higher profitability are available in the economy. Some 
studies have applied the distinction between specific and general skills to the study 
of labour market institutions. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002) make of the loss 
of human capital during unemployment spells one of the key parameters of their 
analysis of labour market institutions. They contrast a ‘laissez-faire’ and a ‘welfare-
state’ economy which emerge as possible equilibria of their setting. Wasmer (2002) 
makes the choice of the investment in specific as opposed to general human capital 
explicit in her analysis. As a result, the structural parameters of the labour market 
favour the acquisition of one or the other type of skill, so that two different steady 
states emerge. In particular, the acquisition of specific (general) skills is favoured by 
less (more) changeable environments. 
The present paper is related to Wasmer (2002) in that the choice between 
specific and general skills is the result of an endogenous choice by workers, which in 
turn depends on the conditions in the labour market. However, with respect to this 
and the other papers cited above, the main contribution of the present paper lies in 
a different character ization of technical progress. In fact, most of the literature 
characterizes technical progress as being embodied in different vintages of a same 
technology. Typically, an exogenous process makes a new vintage of a certain 
technology available at each instant of time, thus making possible to the agent to 
switch to a more recent vintage or stay put in the vintage currently used. New 
vintages are characterized by higher overall productivity, although, as stressed 
above, learning-by-doing effects may prevent an agent from attaining newly 
available vintages. This approach is consistent with the view that technological 
progress is of the general purpose type, that is, it is accessible to all the economic 
agents. 
In the present model I instead take the opposite view that technological progress 
is not of the general purpose type. In spite of its indubitable relevance (see e.g. Petit 
and Soete, 2001) only rarely has this case been investigated in the literature, an 
exception being the model of Violante et al. (2002) in their account of wage 
inequalities within a model of growth. This is partly due to the fact that much 
attention has been recently given to the so called Information Technology 
revolution, which is seen by many as having radical effects on today’s societies. 
Given its wide range of applicability across industries and jobs, this may be deemed 
as a typical general purpose technology. However, this should not lead us to neglect 
the role of sector-specific, if not firm-specific - incremental innovations in 
technological progress (Dosi, 1988). Hence, some investigation in this area appears 
to be necessary, and, as outlined in section 4, may also help generate innovative 
empirical research. 
In the present model I assume that two technologies are available to pro duce the 
same commodity, and that an innovation occurs in one and only one technological 
sector. This boosts the productivity potential of that sector with respect to the 
other. Moreover, workers may choose between acquiring specific or general skills 
before entering the labour market. Specific skills tie workers to one technology of 
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the economy, but in turn bring about, ceteris paribus, higher marginal productivity 
relative to general skill. Conversely, general skills allow workers to move towards 
the technological sector where the innovation has occurred, but determine smaller 
levels of marginal productivity. Specific skills are characterized by requiring the 
payment of a cost by a worker who wants to acquire this type of skill, which will 
prove a critical factor of the model. Finally, labour market rigidity is characterized 
by the transfer costs that general skilled workers have to pay to move from the non-
innovating to the innovating sector of the economy. 
The equilibrium conditions for this economy are then studied. This enables to 
spell out the trade-off  between what I call ex ante and ex post efficiency. The former 
requires more workers to acquire specific skills, because the gap in marginal 
productivity between specific and general skill production imp lies that more output 
may be produced by transferring workers from the latter to the former sector of 
production. On the other hand, ex post efficiency calls for more workers acquiring 
general skills, as this enables more workers to move to the innovating sector after 
the innovation has occurred. I show that higher labour market rigidity, as modelled 
in the present setting,  has a positive (negative) effect on ex ante (ex post) efficiency. 
The overall relationship between rigidity and total output is non-linear, and gives 
rise to an inverse-U shaped pattern, with ex ante efficiency being predominant at 
low values of rigidity, and vice versa. 
The model allows a comparison between the incentives to invest in specific as 
opposed to general skill in a context characterized by non-general purpose technical 
change. This offers a direct counterargument to Saint-Paul’s idea that removing 
rigidities will boost productivity by pushing out of the market firms that are not 
productive. In terms of this model, that argument only takes into account ex post, 
but not ex ante, efficiency. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the setting of the 
model and puts forward  the conditions for a steady state. Section 3 studies the 
impact of a change in labour market rigidity on the steady state of the economy, 
and discusses its effects on production. Finally, section 4 concludes and suggests 
possible extensions of the model. 
2 The Model 
2.1 Basic Features 
The model I develop is related to Violante et al.  (2002) in assuming that two 
different technologies are available to produce a certain commodity, and in that 
technological change is not of the general purpose type. That is, innovations 
occurring for a technology  cannot be used to improve the productivity of the other. 
In particular, I model technological change by assuming that at each unit of time a 
technical innovation occurs for just one of the two technologies, with even 
probability for this event to happen. In other words, although there is certainty that 
an innovation will occur, it is a priori unknown in which technology the innovation 
will take place. Moreover, I abstract away from dynamic economies of scale, which 
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may make innovations more or less likely in one of the two sectors depending on 
the past history of technical progress, and I assume that technologies are exactly 
equivalent prior to the innovation taking place .  
Another crucial assumption I make is that the workforce entering the high-tech 
sector may choose between two different types of skills, which I call specific  and 
general. A specific  worker is able to work more efficiently on a given technology 
relative to a general skill worker, so that her productivity is ceteris paribus higher. 
However, a general skill worker is able to transfer her skills across the two 
technologies more easily than a specific worker. For simplicity, I assume that 
specific workers may only be employed  in one technology, whereas general skill 
workers may migrate across the two technologies, up to a transfer cost. Another 
way to look at this assumption is to think that a specific skill worker executes a 
specific investment in the firm at which she is hired , which makes it economically 
unprofitable to switch to the alternative technology. In particular, workers have to 
choose in which sector to locate as they enter the high-tech sector. Being the 
individual probability of innovation equal to ½, agents are indifferent as to which 
technological sector to choose, so that they will distribute equally across the two 
sectors. In this version of the model, I do not model managers’ choice explicitly, and 
I assume in particular that they may not move across sectors. 
The timing of the model is described in the diagram below. Agents decide as to 
whether to acquire specific  or general skills prior to accessing the labour market. 
Their type of skills remains fixed thereafter. Each agent has then to choose which 
technological sector to enter. Once such a choice has been made, a manager and a 
worker are matched and constitute a firm. Subsequently, workers observe in which 
technique the innovation has occurred, and general skill workers may decide to 
migrate towards the alternative sector upon the payment of a transfer cost. At this 
point, production occurs and wages are paid according to workers’ marginal 
productivity.                     
 
Workers 
choose their 
skills 
Workers 
choose in 
which of the 
two sectors to 
locate 
Workers are 
hired by 
managers 
An innovation 
occurs in one 
of the two 
technologies 
Generalised-
skilled workers 
can swap 
sector 
Production 
takes place and 
workers are 
paid their 
wages. 
 
Figure 2 
 
I now illustrate the formal specification of the model proceeding backwards. 
The superscripts S, G denote whether agents have acquired a specific or a general 
type of skill, respectively. The subscript I, N and M denote the sectors where 
workers are located. In particular, I stands for innovating sector, N non-innovating 
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sector, and M characterizes those workers with general skills who migrate from the 
non-innovating to the innovating sector.  
First, let us deal with the innovating sectors. Managers who are active in this 
sector maximize the following profit function: 
 
( )GMGIGISIIGISII llwlwYY +--+=p       ( 1 ) 
where 
( )( )atg SISSI lAY += 1         ( 2 ) 
( )( )ag GMGIGGI llAY ++= 1        ( 3 ) 
 
and where the following set of restrictions apply: 
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Managers can employ both specific  and general skill workers, whose respective 
contributions to production are additively separable. In particular, note that the 
general skill labour input comprises both workers who were already located in this 
sector, or who have migrated after the innovation has taken place. Different wage 
rates are paid to specific  and general skill workers on the basis of their marginal 
productivity, but the same wage rate is paid to the two categories of general skill 
workers. Furthermore, output has decreasing returns to scale on labour in both the 
specific and the general labour input3. Specific skill workers are characterized as 
being more effective in using a certain technology. This  is reflected in two 
assumptions on the parameters . First, the overall productivity of the relative 
production function is ceteris paribus higher than the other (AS>AG). Second, 
specific skill workers are better able to reap the benefits of the innovation. In fact, 
an innovation brings about a productivity bonus equal to (1+t?) when used by 
specific skill workers, and equal to just (1+g) when used by a general skill worker. 
Hence, t denotes the degree to which specific skill workers are better capable than 
general skill workers in utilising the innovation. 
 Maximization of the profit function with respect to either labour input yields 
the following optimality conditions: 
 
( )( ) 11 -+= atga SISSI lAw        ( 5 ) 
                                              
3 In a more complex version of the model, where managers are mobile across sectors, too, the production 
function may have decreasing returns in each input of production and constant return in both inputs. See 
Rigolini (2004) for an example. However, this generalization does not appear to change the main conclusions 
of this paper. 
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Additionally, I assume that the transfer cost equals a proportion cT of the wage 
general skill workers earn in the innovating sector. The net wage rate that accrues to  
those of them migrating to the innovating sector is then equal to:  
 
( )TGIGM cww -= 1          ( 7 ) 
 
Let us now consider the sector that does not innovate. Managers who are 
active therein will maximize  the following profit function: 
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( )aSNSSN lAY =          ( 9 ) 
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This is identical to (1) through (3) above but for the absence of the productivity 
bonus associated with the innovation. GNl  is the number of general skill workers 
who do not migrate to the innovating sector. Optimal employment of labour yields 
the following conditions: 
 
( ) 1-= aa SNSSN lAw         ( 11 ) 
( ) 1-= aa GNGGN lAw         ( 12 ) 
2.2 The Equilibrium Conditions  
Since in this version of the model managers are assumed not to be able to move 
across sectors (see footnote 3), the equilibrium conditions only concern workers’ 
decisions. Overall w e have five different categories of workers, specific and non-
specific active in either the innovating or in the non-innovating sector, and non-
specific skill workers migrating to the innovating sectors. I therefore need five 
conditions to determine labour sectoral allocation and the choice of skills. 
Equations (5) – (7) and (11)-(12) above will set wages accordingly.  
Firstly, conditions (13) and (14) are direct consequences of the way the model 
has been constructed:  
 
S
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I ll =           ( 13 ) 
M
I
G
N
G
I lll +=          ( 14 ) 
 
Each condition requires the distribution of workers across the two technological 
sectors to be even. The reason is that workers have to choose a sector before the 
innovation occurs, so that each sector should look equally profitable to both specific  
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and non-specific skill workers. Condition (15) requires the number of workers 
employed be equal to the total supply of labour L.  
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I do not consider the possibility of unemployment, so that (15) is always satisfied. 
Condition (16) requires general skill workers who are located in the non-innovating 
sector to be indifferent between migrating to the alternative sector and remaining in 
the current sector:  
 
G
N
G
M ww =          ( 16 ) 
 
In fact, if GMw  was greater than GNw , then more general skill workers would have an 
incentive to move to the innovating sector. In contrast, were the opposite true, 
some workers who had migrated to the innovating sector would in fact be better off 
in the non-innovating sector.  
The final condition concerns which type of skill to acquire. A specific  skill 
worker has a probability equal to ½ of earning a wage in either the innovating or in 
the non-innovating sector, so that her expected wage, denoted with Sw~ , amounts to:  
 
( )( )SSNSIS cwww -+= 12
1~         ( 17 ) 
 
In (17) I have also made the assumption that a specific worker has to pay a portion 
cS of her expected wage in order to acquire the specialisation. As we shall see in the 
remainder of the paper, this will turn out to be a crucial hypothesis. 
For the same reason, a non-specific  worker can expect a wage equal to:  
 
( )GNGIG www += 2
1~         ( 18 ) 
 
Expression (18) for expected general skill wage makes use of condition (16) above in 
that a worker who is originally located in the non-innovating sector ends up with 
the same wage whether she moves to the alternative sector or not. Moreover, I 
assume that no additional co st is required to acquire this type of skill, unlike specific 
skill workers .  
 Finally, condition (19) requires the expected wage of specific  and non-specific 
skill workers to be equal to one another : 
 
GS ww ~~ =          ( 19 ) 
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I define a steady state of the system as the set of wage rates and labour allocations 
that satisfies the system of 10 equations given by (5) – (7), (11)-(12), (13)-(16) and 
(19). 
2.3 Efficiency 
Some notion of efficiency is needed in order to evaluate different institutional 
settings. The notion I shall employ throughout the paper is the maximization of 
overall output. Obviously, a necessary condition for output maximization is that 
marginal productivity across the various sectors of the economy be equal to  one 
another. For an increase in output may always be obtained by transferring labour 
inputs from the sector with lower marginal productivity towards the other.  
Some caveats  apply. The notion of efficiency as output maximization clearly 
differs from the c lassical notion of Pareto-efficiency. The reason for preferring 
output maximization is that Pareto-efficiency does not seem to be appropriate in the 
present context. In fact,  Pareto -efficient allocations would be crucially affected by 
the dynamics of income distribution between capital and labour, and within the 
various labour categories. Since this is not the main focus of the paper, it is 
preferable to adopt a notion that abstracts away from distributive issues. Moreover, 
given the number of different categories of labour, and of capital holders, the risk is 
high that Pareto-efficiency would be too weak a concept to discriminate among 
allocations. Moreover, payoffs in the present model are computed in terms of 
monetary compensations. This makes it possible  that output-maximizing allocations 
may become Pareto -improving by appropriate monetary side-transfers, in case they 
were not so originally . In other words, suppose that an output-maximizing 
allocation A were not Pareto -optimal, in that some agent is worse off in that 
allocation than in another  allocation B with a lesser amount of output. Even so, one 
may think that a transfer from the better-off agents, which is always made possible 
by A having higher output than B, may compensate the worse -off agent for her loss 
in the output-maximizing allocation.  
Another caveat  refers to the exclusion of both transfer costs and skill upgrade 
costs from the efficiency computation. However, it suffices to assume that such 
costs represent the income for some agents who are part of the economy system, 
and whose utility is worth taking into account by the policy -maker. Consequently , 
the relative costs and benefits cancel out in the society’s overall measure of 
efficiency. For instance, one may think that the costs for the acquisition of specific 
skill are paid to some other specific skilled worker or to the manager of the firm, for 
example because skills are acquired through on-the-job training. Furthermore, as I 
shall illustrate later, the cross-sector transfer costs are alike instruments of economic 
policy, and as such they are alike fiscal revenues for the government. As such, they 
may be thought of as being redistributed to the agents after they are collected. 
As will become clear in the course of the analysis, I shall be dealing with two 
types of efficiency. Ex ante efficiency looks as output maximization before agents’ 
decisions on which skill to acquire and thus before the occurrence of the 
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innovation. Ex post efficiency assess es output maximization after the innovation has 
occurred. It will soon become clear that these two notions have contrasting 
implications for labour allocation across different sectors. 
3 The Impact of an Increase in Labour Market Rigidity 
3.1 An Overview 
In analogy with Saint-Paul (2000), I model labour market rigidity as 
depending on the transfer costs with which agents are faced when changing their 
job. The underlying idea is that in more rigid labour markets agents have to sustain 
greater transfer costs when a worker decides to quit a job and/or a man ager makes a 
worker redundant in comparison with more flexible labour market. In the present 
model, since it is workers who make decisions as to the sector in which to locate, an 
increase in labour market rigidity may thus be represented by an increase in cT. 
Since costs are in this version of the model sustained by workers, this may be 
thought of as a penalty that a non-specific worker has to pay to her former manager 
in the non-innovating sector – or to the government - in order to abandon that firm 
and move to a firm in the innovating sector.. Moreover, I assume that cT is set by the 
economy’s policy maker, so that it is possible to link explicitly the value that cT 
assumes with different institutional settings. That is, economies with higher values 
for cT will be thought of as having higher level of labour market rigidity 4.  
I am in particular interested in studying the influence of cT on the steady state 
allocation of labour and on the output produced in the economy. There are two 
ways in which cT may affect total output, which are associated with the ex ante and 
the ex post stages, that is, prior to and after the innovation has occurred. First, an 
increase in cT will have the effect of making the option of acquiring a specific skill 
more attractive to workers in the ex ante phase in which they have to decide which 
skill to acquire. The reason is that the higher cT, the lower the expected wage for 
general skill workers. Consequently, more workers will be employed in the specific 
skill sectors of production in  the economy, which will increase output given the 
presence of a productivity premium in that sector. This is a consequence of the rent 
acquired by specific skill workers for their investment in specific human capital, an 
aspect which will be further commented in section 3.4. Second, an increase in cT  will 
ex post curtail the possibility for general skill workers to move towards the 
innovating sector. As a result, fewer workers will be able to move to the sector of 
the economy where technology is more efficient, thus reducing output. Therefore, 
an increase in cT has at the same time a positive effect on output in that it makes ex 
ante  more convenient for workers to acquire a specific skill, but has a negative effect 
in that it hinders the possibility for general skill workers to migrate to the more 
efficient sector of the economy. These two effects are consequences of the ex ante 
and ex post  notions of efficiency put forward in section 2.3, and the main goal of this 
                                              
4 cT may also be thought as i ncorporating some relocation costs that are not under the direct control of the 
policy-maker, such as costs for geographical relocations, fixed legal costs, etc.  
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section of the paper will be to clarify under which conditions either effect will 
prevail.  
Since all of these effects are mediated by adjustments on labour allocation 
across sectors and skills, I start off by studying their effects on the economy by 
investigating the steady state configuration of labour. I commence with the results 
for general skills in section 3.2; section 3.3 comments on the results for specific skill 
labour, and section 3.4 finds general results in terms of output. In the appendix I 
report the analytical solution for the steady state in (23)-(26), and the proofs of the 
lemmas. 
3.2 Effects on General Skill Labour Allocation 
The first relevant result concerns the mobility of general skill workers across 
sectors: 
 
Lemma 1: As c T increases, there will be fewe r general skill workers able to transfer from 
the non-innovating to the innovating sector: 
TT
T
G
M cc
c
l <"<
¶
¶      0  
 
The value of Tc is given in (28). It represents the greatest value that transfer costs can 
assume for an internal solution of the steady state. In fact, as shown in the 
Appendix, for values of Tc above Tc , a corner solution obtains where no general skill 
worker wishes to transfer to the innovating sector. The reason is that transfer costs 
are then too high in comparison to the productivity premium to make transfer from 
the non-innovating to the innovating sector economically convenient. Hence, I 
limit the study of the model to values of Tc below Tc . What Lemma 1 implies is not 
surprising. The higher the transfer costs, the fewer  the general skill workers who are 
able to transfer to the innovating sector. Lemma 2 concerns general skill workers 
active in the innovating sector: 
 
Lemma 2: There exists an internal minimum in the steady state ex ante allocation of 
general skill labour in the innovating sector with respect to the transfer costs. In 
particular, G
Il is increasing (decreasing) in cT for values greater (smaller) than a threshold 
Tcˆ . Moreover, such a minimum is unique:  
TTT
G
I
T
G
I cccl
c
l <-Û-
¶
¶ >
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>
<
ˆ,ˆ0  
 
The expression for 
Tcˆ  is given in (30). The fact that the ex ante allocation of general 
skill worker decreases  below the threshold Tcˆ  is not surprising. In fact, the higher 
the transfer costs, the lower the expected wage for general skill workers, and thus 
the fewer the workers who acquire  this type of skill ex ante. The existence of a 
threshold beyond which the pattern of labour allocation changes is perhaps more 
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surprising. This is due to the wage dynamics and to the shape of the production 
function, and will be further commented in section 3.3.  
 
Lemma 3: As c T increases, the amount of general skill workers active in the innovating 
sector will decrease: 
( )
TT
T
G
M
G
I cc
c
ll <"<
¶
+¶      0  
 
Both GIl  and GMl  decrease for TT cc ˆ< . For values of Tc  above the threshold, instead, the 
fact that G
Il starts growing is offset by the decrease in GMl . Overall, then, general skill 
labour in the innovating sector decreases as transfer costs rise. This result leads 
directly to: 
 
 
 
Corollary 1: As cT increases, production by general skill workers active in the 
innovating sector will decrease: 
TT
T
G
I cc
c
Y <"<
¶
¶      0  
 
This result is now to be contrasted with what occurs in the non-innovating sector 
for general skill workers: 
 
Lemma 4: As c T increases, the amount of general skill workers active in the non -
innovating sector will increase: 
TT
T
G
N cc
c
l <">
¶
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The fact that more and more workers are unable to transfer to the innovating sector 
causes general skill labour to increase with Tc . Hence, as far as GNl  is concerned, this 
effect must compensate the ex ante disincentive to acquire general skills  due to 
increased transfer costs. Consequently: 
 
Corollary 2: As cT increases, production by general skill workers active in the non -
innovating sector will increase: 
TT
T
G
N cc
c
Y <">
¶
¶      0  
 
The impact of 
Tc on overall production by general skill workers is therefore 
ambiguous. Lemma 5 states that the impact is in fact negative throughout the 
relevant interval.  
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Lemma 5: As c T increases, overall production by general skill workers will decrease: 
TT
T
G
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c
Y <"<
¶
¶      0  
where: 
G
N
G
I
G YYY +=         ( 20 ) 
 
This result is quite intuitive; higher transfer costs hinder general skill workers 
mobility from the less productive to the more productive sector of the economy. As 
a result, production from general skill workers decreases. This result reflects what I 
have defined above as ex post efficiency . The increase in transfer costs hampers the 
possibility of transferring labour inputs of the general type towards the more 
efficient sector of the economy. In this sense, higher labour market rigidity is 
detrimental to the economy in that it prevents adjustment to sectors  with higher 
productivity. This idea may be restated more formally in Lemma 6:  
 
Lemma 6: The only ex post efficient allocation of labour inputs is for cT=0.  The higher cT, the 
more ex post--inefficient the allocation is. 
 
This result descends directly from the definition of efficiency that I am using. For 
positive values of cT, a gap is created between the two marginal productivity, as 
defined in expression (32) and (33) in the Appendix. Such gap is reduced to nought 
when cT=0 . Hence, one may say that ex post  efficiency is maximized by setting cT=0. 
3.3 Effects on Specific  Skill Labour Allocation 
The implications described in Lemma 5 and 6 above are to be contrasted  with 
the following results for specific skill workers: 
 
Lemma 7: There exists  an internal maximum in the steady state allocation of labour in 
the specific skill sector with respect to transfer costs. In particular, specific skill labour is 
increasing (decreasing) in cT for values smaller (greater) than the same threshold Tcˆ  as in 
Lemma 2 above. Moreover, such a maximum is unique. That is,  
},{;ˆ,ˆ0 NIjcccl
c
l
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This result is symmetrical to what found in Lemma 2. For values below the 
threshold 
Tcˆ , as Tc  increases, more workers will prefer to choose the specific type of 
skill, as the expectation of higher mobility costs in the alternative type of skill will 
hinder mobility and thus decrease the expected wage were they to acquire general 
skills. However, for values of 
Tc  above the threshold, this pattern is reversed. This is 
linked to the wage dynamics for general skill workers. Lemma 1 states that, as cT 
rises, fewer workers will be able to move from the non-innovating towards the 
innovating sector of the economy. This has two opposite effects on wages earned by 
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general skill workers. On the one hand, it will increase the wages of workers active 
in the innovating sector, because, as Lemma 2 shows, the overall number of workers 
who are active in that sector will drop. On the other hand, for symmetrical reasons, 
it will also decrease the wages o f workers active in the non-innovating sector. 
However, these two effects are not equal in size, and expected general skill wages 
present a U-shaped pattern with respect to cT. In particular, for values of cT below 
(above) Tcˆ , the latter (former) between these two effects dominates, so that expected 
wages for general skill workers will decrease (increase). As a result, the number of 
workers acquiring specific  skills will decrease when cT exceeds the threshold Tcˆ , 
because the rise in expected wages in the general skill sector makes it ex ante more 
attractive to acquire the alternative type of skill.  Alternatively, given the 
equilibrium condition (19) requiring the equality of expected wages for specific and 
general skill workers, fewer specific skill workers are needed in order to rise specific 
skill wages and compensate the rise of general skill wage. 
More importantly, Lemma 7 leads to the following 
 
Corollary 3: There exists an internal maximum in the steady state production from 
specific skill workers with respect to transfer costs. In particular, production from specific 
skill labour is increasing (decreasing) in cT for values smaller (greater) than the threshold 
Tcˆ . Moreover, such a maximum is unique. That is,  
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where: 
S
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Corollary 3 underpins the ex ante efficiency argument set out above. Corollary 3 
states that higher transfer costs  have, for values of cT below the threshold 
Tcˆ , a 
positive impact on production from specific skill workers. The reason for this is 
apparent: higher transfer costs imply a decline in the expected general skill wage, so 
that more workers will find it optimal to acquire  specific skills. Lemma 7 restates 
this argument in terms of efficiency: 
 
Lemma 8: The only ex ante-efficient allocation of labour inputs is for cT=
Tcˆ . The closer the 
economy to this value, the more ex ante--efficient the allocation is.  
 
3.4 Overall Effects 
We have seen how ex ante efficiency prescribes to allocating more resources to 
specific skills  (Lemma 8), whereas ex post efficiency calls for increasing the share of 
general skill workers (Lemma 6), which makes it possible a better use of technical 
innovations. It is then important to ask which between these two effects dominates. 
The following Lemma states a general result in this respect: 
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Lemma 9: Suppose Sc  is strictly positive. Then, there exists a maximum in the region 
( ]Tcˆ,0  where total output as a function of Tc is maximized:  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }  argmaxsuch that  ˆ 0,  ** TGTS
c
TTT cYcYccc
T
+=Î$  
 
Lemma 9 claims that an economic system will increase its overall efficiency in the 
presence of some positive levels of labour market rigidity. Clearly, such a level 
implies that, in this decentralized economy, ex ante  and ex post efficiency are traded 
off in an optimal way.  
The reason for this result lies in the role played by the training costs Sc . As 
shown in the proof of Lemma 8 in the Appendix, the productivity gap between 
marginal product from specific and general skill production depends on Sc . This is 
in turn caused by the equilibrium condition (19) between expected wages in the two 
sectors, which implies that, ex post, the average wage for specific skill workers must 
be greater than the average wage for general skill workers 5. This compensates 
specific skill workers for the payment of their training costs. Since wages are set 
according to ex post marginal productivity, this means that on average marginal 
productivity in the specific skill sector is higher than in the general skill sector. 
Therefore, a transfer of workers from the latter to the former sector brings about, 
on average , an increased level of output. In other words, the presence of such a 
‘rent’ for specific skill workers creates a distortion in the allocation of factors of 
production, which is minimized by increasing the number of specific skill workers. 
What has just been illustrated is the mechanism underlying the ex ante 
efficiency argument. In fact, the presence of the mobility costs Tc adds another source 
of distortion, which consists of the constraints for general skill workers to move 
towards the innovating sector. We already noted in Lemma 6 how ex post  efficiency 
calls for a value for Tc  as low as possible. However, mobility costs have at the same 
time an impact on ex ante efficiency, in that the higher Tc , the higher  the incentives 
for workers to acquire specific skills. This reduces the distortions associated with 
the specific skill ‘rent’, and thus maximizes ex ante efficiency. Lemma 9 states a 
general result on the interaction between these two effects, and shows that some 
positive levels of labour market rigidity lead to higher efficiency in the economy . 
4 Conclusions and Possible Extensions of the Model  
 
The model developed in this paper has sought to show how, taking into account 
non-general purpose technical change and multiplicity of skills, labour market 
rigidity may have positive effects on an economy’s output. The mechanism which 
leads to this result is that higher labour market rigidity raises the incentives to 
acquire productivity-enhancing skills. This is crucially due to the presence of a ‘rent’ 
accruing to specific skill workers for the cost they have to sustain in the ex ante 
                                              
5 Rearranging condition (19) leads to 0>=- SS
GS wcww , where ( ) 2SNSIS www +=  and ( ) 2GNGIG www += . 
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phase of their skill acquisition. This creates a productivity gap between production 
from specific and general skill workers, which makes ex ante efficient to increase the 
share of the former. On the other hand, labour market flexibility is optimal ex post, 
because this allows more general skill workers to transfer to the innovating sector of 
the economy. The interactio n between these two effects leads to an inverse-U 
relation between labour market rigidity and output, which implies that some 
degrees of labour market rigidity are indeed beneficial for the economy. Therefore, 
the argument that some economists have put forward as to the efficiency gains of 
rigid labour markets are confirmed in this model. However, the explanation offered 
is new, in that this is the consequence of the generally neglected idea of non-general 
purpose technological change. 
Obviously, the model lends itself to several generalisations. Firstly, the focus on 
a static problem has made it possible to study in detail the trade offs between labour 
market institutions, skills acquisition, and technical change. However, the study of 
dynamic effects, that is, the repetition of production on an arbitrarily long horizon, 
would introduce into the analysis the consideration of the ‘turbulence’ in the 
environment. This would permit us to take into account the role of skills as an 
insurance against variability in the environment. Since it is generally thought that 
general skills are better protection against fast technical change than specific skills 
(Wasmer, 2002), then the trade off between ex ante and ex post efficiency may result 
in a different outcome than what obtained in the present model. The study of this 
aspect would also have an obvious bearing on the role of globalisation in reshaping 
labour market institutions. As mentioned in the introduction, in fact, economic 
globalisation is seen as one of the major causes in the increased variability of the 
economic environment over the last decades.  
Second, the model is amenable to what I believe would be innovative empirical 
analysis. The model rests on the distinction between specific and general skills, and 
introduces a horizontal differentiation in human capital that adds to the vertical 
characterization that is normally taken into account. That is, human capital and 
skills are usually associated with a higher level of educational attainment. In the 
present setting, instead, the choice between specific and general skills is central to 
the analysis. In empirical terms, this may be associated with different kinds of 
educational degrees, rather than with different degrees of educational attainment, so 
that the re lation between skill differentiation and labour market rigidity may be 
investigated. Moreover, an index of globalisation may be employed in the analysis 
to test whether increased variability in the economy environment, as measured by 
globalisation, may influence the institutional setting present in the economy.  
5 Appendix  
The solution of the system of equations leads to the following steady state 
expressions for labour allocations across sectors and skills: 
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Intuitively, D1 depends positively on the incentives to migrate towards the 
innovating sector for general skill workers in the ex post stage. D2, instead, weighs 
the incentives to acquire specific skills vis-à-vis general ones in the ex ante phase. As 
a result, a higher value of D1 relative to D2 favours allocation of labour to the general 
skills. A condition must be imposed on D1 to ensure that GMl  does not enter the 
negative region. That is, D1 has to be non-negative, which leads to: 
 
gg +º£ 1TT cc         ( 28 ) 
 
I assume that such a condition is always satisfied, so that the system is studied over 
the range [ ]TT cc ,0Î . Intuitively, the above condition requires the productivity gain 
in the innovating sector be sufficiently high in comparison to the transfer costs.  
D2 is non-negative across the relevant range of parameters. I also define 
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so that { }1
2
1
31 -= DD . As a result of the above restriction, the parameters have to 
satisfy the following inequalities for [ ]TT cc ,0Î : 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
Differentiating GMl  with respect to cT leads to: 
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Given the above restrictions on the parameters, this expression is always negative 
over the interval [ ]Tc,0 . QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Differentiating GIl  with respect to cT leads to: 
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Given the restrictions imposed on the parameters, it is immediate to verify that this 
expression is negative for 0=Tc  and positive for TT cc = . Moreover, there exists only 
a value in which the differential is equal to 0, that is: 
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Such a value lies in the interior of the interval [ ]Tc,0 . 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
Differentiating GM
G
I ll +  with respect to cT leads to: 
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Given the above restrictions on the parameters, this expression is always negative 
over the interval [ ]Tc,0 . QED 
 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Differentiating GNl  with respect to cT leads to: 
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Given the above restrictions on the parameters, this expression is always positive 
over the interval [ ]Tc,0 . QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 5 
By applying the chain rule, one obtains: 
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After recalling the expressions for production, steady state labour allocation and the 
results from Lemma 3, and after simplifying, one obtains: 
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This expression is negative over the interval [ ]Tc,0 .  
Similarly, one has: 
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After plugging in the relevant expressions from Lemma 4, and after some 
simplifications, the following expression obtains: 
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This is a positive expression over the relevant interval.  
After summing up the two derivatives, we obtain: 
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After some tedious algebra, the expression in brackets can be simplified so as to 
yield: 
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Proof of Lemma 6 
From the wage -setting rules (6), (7), (12), and from the equilibrium condition (16), 
one can derive the following inequality: 
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Since ex post efficiency is associated with marginal productivity being equal in the 
innovating and non-innovating generalised skill production, it is apparent from (31) 
that the only allocation where this occurs is for 0=Tc . 
 
Proof of Lemma 7 
 
Differentiating SIl  with respect to cT leads to: 
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Proof of Lemma 8: 
 
From the equilibrium condition (19), and considering the wage-setting rules (5), (6), 
(7), (11), (12), one derives the following ineq uality: 
 
( ) 0>+=- SNSISGS wwcMPMP       ( 34 ) 
where  
S
S
S
l
Y
MP
¶
¶
=          ( 35 ) 
G
G
G
l
Y
MP
¶
¶
=          ( 36 ) 
S
N
S
I
S lll +=          ( 37 ) 
G
N
G
M
G
I
G llll ++=         ( 38 ) 
 
Given the negative relation between wages and labour, the right-hand side of (34) is 
minimized when Sl reaches its maximum, that is, according to Lemma 7, when 
TT cc ˆ= . Hence, ex ante efficiency is maximized for TT cc ˆ= , and efficiency gains may 
be obtained by moving closer to this value.  
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Proof of Lemma 9 
Suppose Sc  is strictly positive. By applying the chain rule, we have: 
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where SNSIS YYY += . Hence, one has to compare the size of this derivative with that 
determined above for GY . After some algebra, this expression reads as follows: 
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After some simplifications, we conclude that the expression in brackets is positive 
for 0=Tc : 
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Moreover, on the grounds of Lemma 5 and Corollary 3 , we may observe that 
derivatives are negative for values of Tc  above Tcˆ :  
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Hence, given the continuity of SY  for [ ]TT cc ,0Î , we can conclude that there exists a 
value of  Tc  internal to the interval [ ]Tc,0  where the derivative of Y  with respect to 
Tc  equals 0. QED 
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